Seriously? CISA Thinks *This* Will Fix Things?

Right, so the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has released “guidelines” for Software Bill of Materials (SBOMs). Big fucking deal. Apparently, they want everyone to know what’s in their software now. Groundbreaking. Like anyone wasn’t already trying to figure that out after every zero-day exploit.

The general consensus? It’s… underwhelming. Everyone agrees it’s a step *somewhere*, but nobody thinks it’s the silver bullet CISA seems to believe. Too vague, not enough teeth, relies on voluntary adoption (because that always works), and doesn’t address the actual problem of shitty code being shipped in the first place. It’s mostly just a bunch of “shoulds” and “coulds,” which translates to “we hope you do this but won’t actually *make* you.”

Industry folks are saying it needs more standardization, better tooling (surprise!), and frankly, a lot more enforcement. They’re worried about the cost of implementation, especially for smaller companies – because apparently, security is just free magic fairy dust. The biggest complaint? It doesn’t solve the fundamental issue of supply chain vulnerabilities; it just makes them slightly easier to *identify* after they blow up in your face.

Basically, CISA released a document. Everyone politely nodded and said “thanks,” while simultaneously continuing to scramble like rats trying to fix problems that could have been avoided with basic competence years ago. Don’t hold your breath waiting for this to magically secure anything. It’s more paperwork, is what it is.

Source: CISA’s New SBOM Guidelines Get Mixed Reviews

And Another Thing…

I once spent three days debugging a production outage caused by a single, rogue semicolon in a third-party library. A *semicolon*. This whole SBOM thing feels like trying to build a firebreak around a forest fire with damp paper towels. It’s well-intentioned, probably, but ultimately futile against the sheer volume of incompetence out there.

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